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Abstract
Since World War II, international trade has expanded exponentially and the United States has
had substantial incentives to negotiate trade agreements with a view toward lowering tariffs re-
ciprocally. The United States has also benefited from entry into the North American Free Trade
Agreement (”NAFTA”) in 1992, the Canada-United States Free-Trade Agreement (”CFTA”) in
1988, and the United States-Israel Free Trade Agreement in 1985. The Canadian goal had been to
eliminate existing antidumping and countervailing duty rules [in the United States] and to negoti-
ate a new set of laws modeled on competition law principles with a binational tribunal to enforce
them. Chapter 19 of the CFTA provides for binational dispute settlement in antidumping and
countervailing duty cases. However, Chapter 19 also retains the substantive domestic antidumping
and countervailing duty laws of the United States and Canada. Article 1904 expressly recites the
parties’ intention to replace judicial review of antidumping and countervailing duty determinations
with binational panel review. The two governments had to agree on the selection of the fifth pan-
elist. In a dissenting opinion of a CFTA Extraordinary Challenge Committee (”ECC”) review of
the panel decision on Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, retired U.S. Circuit Judge
Malcolm Wilkey criticizes the limited review practices of ECCs. Canada and Chile agreed to phase
out antidumping, but not countervailing duty policies for the purposes of their bilateral agreement.
This address discusses the binational dispute settlement panels established by Chapter 19 of the
CFTA. This address proceeds to address Chapter 19 of NAFTA which substantially replicates the
binational panel mechanism established by the CFTA. This speech concludes by discussing U.S.
Circuit Judge Malcolm Wilkey’s dissenting opinion in Certain Softwood Lumber Products from
Canada and remarking that the United States should be chary to expand the binational review
panel system in future trade agreements.
ADDRESS
RESOLUTION OF TRADE DISPUTES BY
CHAPTER 19 PANELS: A LONG-TERM




Since World War II, international trade has expanded expo-
nentially and the United States has had substantial incentives to
negotiate trade agreements with a view toward lowering tariffs
reciprocally. The benefits of these efforts have been particularly
apparent in the formation and operations of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade' and the World Trade Organization.2
The United States has also benefited from entry into the North
American Free Trade Agreement3 ("NAFTA") in 1992, the Can-
ada-United States Free-Trade Agreement4 ("CFTA") in 1988,
and the United States-Israel Free Trade Agreement5 in 1985.
These agreements entered into by the United States reflect an
international movement, particularly within regional areas, to re-
duce tariff barriers to trade. 6
As treaties have reduced tariffs, interest in the remedies
* Chief Judge, United States Court of International Trade. This Address was
presented at the Annual Dinner of the Customs and International Trade Bar Associa-
tion on April 16, 1997. A similar version of this Address appears at 27 STETSON L. REV.
643 (1997).
1. The Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs &
Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
2. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1143 (1994) [hereinafter WTO].
3. The North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U:S., 32
I.L.M. 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
4. Canada-United States Free-Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 281 [here-
inafter CETA].
5. United States-Israel Free Trade Agreement, Apr. 22, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 623.
6. See, e.g., Treaty of Asuncion, Mar. 26, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1041 (establishing com-
mon market between Argentine Republic, Federative Republic of Brazil, Republic of
Paraguay, and Republic of Uruguay); Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community,
July 4, 1973, 946 U.N.T.S. 17, (establishing CARICOM); The Association of Southeast
Asian Nations Declaration (Bangkok Declaration) Aug. 8, 1967, 6 I.L.M. 1233 (estab-
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available under countervailing duties laws and antidumping duty
laws seems to have increased. While the United States has
wanted to ensure that its domestic companies are not subjected
to unfair foreign competition, other countries have undoubtedly
viewed U.S. countervailing duty laws and antidumping statutes as
generally protectionist. With the sweep of these and many other
considerations as a backdrop, the Reagan Administration suc-
cessfully negotiated the CFTA. The negotiation and completion
of the CFTA was brought about in no small measure by the moti-
vation of the world's two largest trading partners to enjoy the
fruits of a free trade area. CFTA achieved this through the re-
duction and elimination of barriers to trade in goods and serv-
ices and to investment.7
Not surprisingly, each side had different objectives that it
hoped to accomplish in the negotiations. In an article published
in the Spring 1995 issue of Law and Policy in International Busi-
ness,' Charles Gastle and Jean-G. Castel, two Canadian lawyers,
discuss the "awkward compromise" that brought about the
CF-TA/NAFTA mechanism for settling disputes. They state:
The Canadian goal had been to eliminate existing antidump-
ing and countervailing duty rules [in the United States] and
to negotiate a new set of laws modeled on competition law
principles with a binational tribunal to enforce them. This
goal proved elusive because U.S. trade officials wanted strict
limits placed upon what they considered to be trade dis-
torting practices through Canada's improper use of subsi-
dies.9
While the Canadians sought to exempt or ameliorate the effect
of U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty laws on its prod-
ucts,' 0 there was strong opposition in the U.S. Congress to weak-
ening these laws.
To resolve this conflict the parties agreed not to change
U.S. or Canadian countervailing and antidumping laws, but
lishing ASEAN); Treaty of Rome, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (establishing Euro-
pean Economic Community).
7. See Canada-United States Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-449, 102 Stat. 1851, § 2(3) (1988).
8. Charles M. Gastle &Jean-G. Castel, Should the North American Free Trade Agreement
Dispute Settlement Mechanism in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases be Reformed in
Light of Softwood Lumber III?, 26 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 823 (1995).
9. Id. at 829.
10. See id.
[Vol. 21:1
CHAPTER 19 PANELS IN TRADE DISPUTES
rather established binational panels for judicial review. While
the CFTA's adoption of the binational panel dispute resolution
system was designed only as an interim measure, this compro-
mise was significant in securing approval of the treaty in both
countries.
I. BINATIONAL PANELS UNDER THE CFYA
Chapter 19 of the CFIA provides for binational dispute set-
tlement in antidumping and countervailing duty cases. How-
ever, Chapter 19 also retains the substantive domestic antidump-
ing and countervailing duty laws of the United States and Can-
ada.11 Article 1904 expressly recites the parties' intention to
replace judicial review of antidumping and countervailing duty
determinations with binational panel review. 2
Panelists were selected from a list of fifty candidates, with
each side submitting the names of twenty-five candidates. All
candidates were to be citizens of Canada or the United States, of
good character, high standing and repute, sound judgment, and
were required to have a general familiarity with trade law. Can-
didates were not to be affiliated with either Party and were not to
take instructions from either Party. Judges were not considered
affiliated with either Party. 3 A majority of the panelists on each
panel were to be lawyers. 14
In the selection of the panel, the United States and Canada
each designated two panelists. 15 The United States Trade Repre-
sentative was responsible for the selection of panelists from the
United States. 6 Each country could exercise four peremptory
challenges. 7 The two governments had to agree on the selec-
tion of the fifth panelist. If there were no consensus, the four
panelists already selected would choose the fifth panelist. If they
11. See CFTA, supra note 4, art. 1902.1 ("Each Party reserves the right to apply its
antidumping law and countervailing duty law to goods imported from the territory of
the other Party.").
12. See id., art. 1904.1 ("As provided in this Article, the Parties shall replace judicial
review of final antidumping and countervailing duty determinations with binational
panel review.").
13. See id., annex 1901.2.1.
14. See id., annex 1901.2.2.
15. See id.
16. See Canada-United States Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-449, 102 Stat. 1888, § 405(a) (2) (A) (1988).
17. See CFTA, supra note 4, annex 1901.2.2.
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could not agree, the fifth panelist was selected by lottery from
the roster of remaining candidates, excluding those who had al-
ready been challenged peremptorily."8
Panel determinations were binding" and both countries
agreed that neither would approve domestic legislation to pro-
vide parties with an ability to appeal a panel decision in its do-
mestic courts. 20 CFTA permitted Parties to the agreement to ap-
peal panel decisions before an Extraordinary Challenge Com-
mittee ("ECC") by alleging:
a) i) a member of the panel was guilty of gross misconduct,
bias, or a serious conflict of interest, or otherwise mate-
rially violated the rules of conduct,
ii) the panel seriously departed from a fundamental rule
of procedure, or
iii) the panel manifestly exceeded its powers, authority or
jurisdiction set forth in this Article, and
b) any of the actions set out in subparagraph (a) has materi-
ally affected the panel's decision and threatens the integ-
rity of the binational panel review process.21
ECCs were comprised of three members who were either
judges or former judges of a federal court of the United States,
or a court of superior jurisdiction in Canada. The ECC mem-
bers were selected from a ten-person roster of which each side
submitted five candidates. Each Party to the agreement chose
one member of the ECC from the roster. The third member was
selected by the two members chosen by the Parties, or, if neces-
sary, by lottery from the roster.22
ECC decisions were binding with respect to the particular
matter between the Parties that was before the panel. Upon
finding that one of the grounds referred to above had been es-
tablished, the ECC had the power to vacate the panel decision or
to remand it to the original panel for action not inconsistent
with the ECC's decision. If the grounds were not established, it
18. See id., annex 1901.2.3.
19. See id., art. 1904.9 ("The decision of a panel under this Article shall be binding
on the Parties with respect to the particular matter between the Parties that is before
the panel.").
20. See id., art. 1904.11 ("A final determination shall not be reviewed under any
judicial review procedures of the importing Party .... Neither Party shall provide in its
domestic legislation for an appeal from a panel decision to its domestic courts.").
21. Id., art. 1904.13.
22. See id., annex 1904.13.1.
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was to affirm the panel decision. If the original decision was va-
cated, a new panel was to be established.
23
It is significant that Chapter 19 was not intended to be per-
manent. It was to have a duration of five years, pending the de-
velopment of a substitute system of rules in both countries re-
garding antidumping and countervailing duties as applied to
their bilateral trade. If no system of rules was implemented,
there was a provision to extend Chapter 19 for two years. After
that, if no agreement to implement a new regime was developed,
either Party to CFTA was to be permitted to terminate the agree-
ment on six months notice. 2 4
The Department of Commerce's Chief Counsel for Interna-
tional Trade testified before a subcommittee of the House Judi-
ciary Committee in Congress that:
[T]he binational panel system is not, and is not intended to
be a model for future agreements between the United States
and its other trading partners. Its workability stems from the
similarity of the U.S. and Canadian legal systems. With that
shared legal tradition as a basis, the panel procedure is simply
an interim solution to a complex issue in an historic agree-
ment with our largest trading partner.25
II. CHAPTER 19 IN NAFTA
The United States and Canada agreed to suspend CFTA
upon NAFTA's enactment on January 1, 1994.26 Nevertheless,
Chapter 19 of NAFTA substantially replicates the binational
panel mechanism established by the CFTA. NAFTA, however,
does contain two significant changes in the binational panel dis-
pute resolution process worth noting. First, NAFTA contains no
language indicating the panel process is intended to be tempo-
rary, as was expressly stated in the CFTA. Second, NAFTA pro-
23. See id., annex 1904.13.3.
24. See id., art. 1906.
25. Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 10 0"h
Cong. 73 (1988) (statement of M. Jean Anderson, Chief Counsel for International
Trade, U.S. Department of Commerce).
26. See Canada-United States Trade Under FIA and NAFI'A: Hearing before the House
Comm. on Small Business, 103rd Cong. 50 (1994) (statement of Charles E. Roh, Jr., Assis-
tant U.S. Trade Representative for North American Affairs, noting "when the NAFTA
entered into force on the first of January of this year, the CITA was suspended.").
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vides the roster of individuals eligible to serve on panels shall
include judges or former judges to the fullest extent practica-
ble.27 There is no'such provision in CFTA. Further, the roster
of individuals eligible to serve as panelists was expanded to sev-
enty-five, with each party to the Agreement selecting twenty-five
candidates.2"
NAFTA made several important changes to the ECC mecha-
nism that are worth noting. First, a party to NAFTA can mount a
challenge to a determination where it believes a panel has failed
to apply the appropriate standard of review. 29 There is no such
language under CFTA. Further, the ECC is directed to examine
the legal and factual analysis underlying the findings and conclu-
sions of the panel's decision in order to determine whether one
of the grounds for vacation or remand, as set forth in Chapter
19, has been met.3" Again, the CFTA includes no similar lan-
guage. Finally, NAFTA lengthens the time ECC has to review a
panel decision from thirty to ninety days.31
In a dissenting opinion of a CFTA ECC review of the panel
decision on Softwood Lumber Products from Canada,3 2 retired U.S.
Circuit Judge Malcolm Wilkey criticizes the limited review prac-
tices of ECCs. Judge Wilkey indicates that if their review is lim-
ited to a narrow perspective of the meaning of impairment of
the integrity of the binational review process, then the review
may be tantamount to no review at all. Judge Wilkey clearly was
upset with the concept that even if it were established that a
Panel misinterpreted U.S. law, that issue would not, in the usual
course, be reviewed by an ECC. Judge Wilkey's dissent points
out that, in testimony antecedent to the approval of the CFTA,
Congress was led to believe that U.S. substantive law pertaining
to dumping and countervailing duties would not change, and
that if Panels strayed, appeals could be made to the ECC.3 4
Judge Wilkey's dissent also points out that the panel did not
27. See NAFrA, supra note 3, annex 1901.2.1.
28. See id.
29. See id., art. 1904.13(a) (iii).
30. See id., annex 1904.13.3.
31. See id., annex 1904.13.2.
32. In re Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, No. ECC-94-1904-01USA (Ex.
Chal. Comm. Aug. 3, 1994) (Wilkey, J., dissenting) [hereinafter Softwood Lumber III].
33. See id. at 11-17.
34. See id. at 7-10, 20-21.
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apply the correct United States standard of review." Canadian
Justice Hart, also a member of the ECC in the Softwood Lumber
case, noted:
I would like to point out that in reality the replacement of
court adjudication by a five-member panel of experts in inter-
national trade law may very well reduce the amount of defer-
ence to the Department in the future. When the Court of
International Trade reviews determinations of Commerce, it
would be expected to bow to the expertise within the Depart-
ment.
3 6
Additionally, Judge Wilkey's dissent discusses briefly the poten-
tial for problems that arise when panelists from countries with
civil law systems are required to apply the standards of review
applied by judges in common law countries and vice versa.3 7 Fi-
nally, Judge Wilkey proceeded to point out that two of the Cana-
dian panelists had serious conflicts, such as providing legal coun-
sel to Canadian lumber interests, the Canadian Government,
and other related interests.38
In a lawsuit recently filed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia, the American Coalition for Competi-
tive Trade challenges the constitutionality of the panel dispute
settlement system established under Chapter 19 of the NAFTA
and the CFTA. The lawsuit also challenges the constitutionality
of the legislation and Executive Orders implementing NAFTA
and CFTA 9
The plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment, finding that the
binational panels and Extraordinary Challenge Committees es-
tablished under NAFTA and the CFTA are without authority to
review, reverse, or modify the decisions of the U.S. Department
of Commerce and the U.S. International Trade Commission, or
any other court or agency of the United States. While it is not
my purpose to report minutely on every aspect of the complaint,
the plaintiff alleges that by entering NAFTA and the CFTA, Con-
35. See id. at 31, 37.
36. Id. at 28 (Hart, J.).
37. See id. at 63-64 (Wilkey, J., dissenting) (noting Mexico is "proudly a Civil Law
country" which "has no mechanism and no concept ofjudicial review of administrative
agency action").
38. See id. at 71-85.
39. American Coalition for Competitive Trade v. United States, Civ. Action No. 97-1036
(D.C. Cir. Jan. 16, 1997) (complaint and petition for declaratory judgment).
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gress and the President exceeded the authority granted to them
respectively by Article I and Article II of the Constitution, by un-
lawfully ceding or otherwise abdicating or delegating to the bina-
tional panels the judicial powers encompassed within the sover-
eignty of the United States.
The plaintiff alleges further that the agreements violate Arti-
cle III, Section 1 of the Constitution, which provides:
Thejudicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish.40
and Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, which provides:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Eq-
uity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their authority .. .41
The plaintiff goes on to complain of deprivation of due process
and equal protection of the laws, violation of the "Appointments
Clause" as set forth in Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the U.S.
Constitution, and violation of separation of powers by impermis-
sibly diminishing and rebalancing the constitutional authority of
the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Branches of the govern-
ment.
I note that the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit recently denied the Government's motion to dismiss the
case on the basis of lack of standing, and it appears the case will
go forward with oral argument, which is scheduled to take place
in October.4 2 It is my understanding that Canada sought to in-
tervene in the suit," and Mexico made application to appear as
an amicus. I do not choose to give an opinion on the constitu-
tionality of the binational panels or the Extraordinary Challenge
Committees' procedures. It is obvious, nevertheless, that this
challenge will create uncertainty, as does any lawsuit, until the
issues it presents are ultimately resolved.
Under NAFTA, from January 1994 to December 1996, par-
ties requested panel review to resolve twenty-four antidumping
40. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 1.
41. Id., § 2.
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or countervailing duty disputes.44 Some matters were resolved
prior to full panel review. Others resulted in the issuance of
opinions on the merits. While I have not had occasion to review
the various determinations, I note that there has already been a
complaint in one dissenting panel opinion that the majority ap-
plied an improper standard of review.45 This situation suggests
that the concerns expressed in Judge Wilkey's dissenting opin-
ion continue to be a problem under NAFTA.
While Chapter 19 of NATA contains provisions apparently
designed to improve the functioning of the binational panel dis-
pute resolution process, some may find the changes are simply
inadequate to repair what may be perceived as a flawed system.
Under the binational panel system, U.S. citizens effectively have
no choice but to take a binational panel route where panelists
decide issues as to the application of U.S. domestic law, and even
the U.S. Constitution as it affects U.S. citizens. The Presidential
Executive Orders implementing CFTA and NAFTA accept in ad-
vance all decisions of binational panels and Extraordinary Chal-
lenge Committees.46 Chapter 19 expressly prohibits any Party to
the agreement from establishing legislatively a procedure to
challenge panel or ECC determinations in their respective do-
mestic court systems.47
Was there, as the Canadian lawyers Gastle and Castel indi-
cated, a fundamental Canadian objective to eliminate existing
U.S. antidumping and countervailing laws? If so, and assuming
that the United States wished to eliminate those laws, presuma-
bly Congress could have passed laws to implement that intent.
Instead, a binational panel system was created that has demon-
strated an ability to infringe upon the legitimate rights of citi-
zens of the United States. If panelists in applicable cases fail to
apply the United States' standard of review, or fail to apply U.S.
domestic law as U.S. courts would apply such law, and ECC re-
fuse to intervene, serious questions under the U.S. Constitution
44. See David Lopez, Dispute Resolution Under NAFTA: Lessons from the Early Experi-
ence, 32 TEX. INT'L L.J. 163, 175 (1997).
45. See id. at 178-79.
46. See Exec. Order No. 12,889, 3 C.F.R. 708 (1994), reprinted in 19 U.S.C. § 3311
(1994) (implementing North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act);
Exec. Order No. 12,662, 3 C.F.R. 624 (1988), reprinted in 19 U.S.C. § 2112 note (1994)
(implementing Canada-United States Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of
1988).
47. See NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1904.11.
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concerning due process and equal protection of the laws will
persist. Where standing U.S. Presidential Executive Orders ap-
prove the decisions of binational panels ECCs before those deci-
sions have been rendered, there is sure to be complaint.
Ironically, the Chapter 19 panel system may tend to impede
the economic goals the Parties have so diligently sought, by in-
jecting confusion in the marketplace. As Judge Wilkey noted,
"[t]he system runs the risk not only of producing egregiously
erroneous results ... but also creating a body of law ... which
will be divergent from United States law applied to countries not
members of NAFTA."4 8 Apparently our current NAFTA partners
have already decided that Chapter 19 is not indispensable. It is
my understanding that Mexico omitted Chapter 19, as incorpo-
rated in NAFTA, from trade agreements with other Latin Ameri-
can countries. Canada and Chile omitted Chapter 19 from the
trade agreement they signed late last year, which some believe
foreshadows an expansion of NAFTA.49 Canada and Chile
agreed to phase out antidumping, but not countervailing duty
policies for the purposes of their bilateral agreement.5"
Recent developments appear to indicate that the United
States' participation in NAFTA will come under increasingly
sharp scrutiny. A bill with bipartisan support was recently intro-
duced in the U.S. House of Representatives to establish
benchmarks to evaluate NAFTA's impact on various sectors of
the U.S. economy. The bill would prohibit NAFTA expansion
unless certain targets are met, and also includes provisions for
the U.S. withdrawal from NAFTA as a last resort.51 Additionally,
with the United States' 1996 trade deficit with Mexico and Can-
ada increasing to US$16.3 billion and US$22.8 billion, respec-
tively, NAFTA will certainly receive Congressional scrutiny.
The United States clearly wants to enjoy the fruits of a free
trade area through the reduction and elimination of barriers to
trade in goods and services and investment. Perhaps, however,
48. Softwood Lumber III, supra note 32, at 57.
49. See Eggleton Announces Bilateral Free Trade Deal Between Canada, Chile, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Nov. 15, 1996, at 1, 32.
50. See id.
51. See, e.g., Bipartisan Coalition Introduces Bill to Measure NAFTA's Performance, 14
INT'L TRADE ReP. (BNA) 482 (Mar. 12, 1997); Peter Morton, Clinton Fights Free Trade
Foes: Disgruntled Lawmakers Attempt to Scuttle Expansion of NAFTA, FIN. POST, Mar. 6, 1997,
at 5.
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the United States should be chary to expand the binational re-
view panel system in future trade agreements, particularly with
the potential for negotiations on Chile's accession to NAFTA
and the creation of a Free Trade Area of the Americas on the
horizon. It would seem keeping Chapter 19, even if it does pass
U.S. Constitutional muster, will perforce add more confusion as
new parties are added; that result can be in the interest of no
one.
